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This paper aims to provide empirical evidence for demonstrating financial additionality 
of multilateral development banks (MDBs) in private participation in infrastructure (PPI) 
projects in terms of financing beyond what is available in the markets. To verify MDB 
financial additionality, this study examines whether the PPI projects with multilateral 
support have significantly larger investment commitments than the total average projects, 
by using the PPI database of the World Bank. The empirical analysis identifies MDB 
financial additionality in that the larger investment commitments of multilateral-
supported projects beyond the average are confirmed in any income levels and regions in 
host countries, and any sectors and types in the projects. In particular, MDB financial 
additionality is valid even in low-income countries where private finance is still too 
premature to be available. In the host countries where their government effectiveness is 
in the poorest edge, however, MDB financial additionality loses its significance, thereby 
requiring the governance enhancement and capacity building in the host countries for its 
additionality to work. 
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Developing and emerging market economies have been and will be faced with an 
enormous demand for infrastructure. Global Infrastructure Outlook by the G20 Initiative 
(Global Infrastructure Hub, 2018) projects that global infrastructure investment needs to 
reach 94 trillion US dollars by 2040 and forecasts the investment gap of about 15 trillion 
US dollars – equal to a 16 percent infrastructure investment deficit by that year. The 
outlook also predicts that meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) increases 
the need by a further 3.5 trillion US dollars, growing the gap to about 18 trillion US 
dollars. In their projection, developing and some emerging countries continue to have 
relatively large infrastructure needs and investment gaps. The World Bank (2019) reports 
that new infrastructure could cost low- and middle-income countries anywhere between 
2 percent and 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) per year to 2030, and that 
investments of 4.5 percent of GDP would enable them to achieve the infrastructure-
related SDGs. 
In accordance with the growing demand for infrastructure, the “private participation 
in infrastructure” (PPI, hereafter) has come to show a significant presence, particularly, 
in developing and emerging market economies. It is because they have suffered from a 
lack of fiscal space to deal with their infrastructure demand, and the PPI has helped fill 
the gap by leveraging financial resources with private sectors. Looking at the total 
investment commitments of PPI projects by the World Bank database1, their values have 
grown by 7.3 times from 1990 to 2019 while the world GDP has increased by 3.7 times 
during the same period.2 
In this context, multilateral development banks (MDBs) are placed to help bridge the 
gap between infrastructure investment demand and private sector participation in 
infrastructure projects. MDBs such as the World Bank, Asian Developing Bank and 
African Development Bank are international institutions that provide financial assistance 
to developing countries with the clear mandate of promoting their economic and social 
development. MDBs can play an important role in helping to fund the investment gap, by 
providing direct financial assistance and also mobilizing additional private sector 
resources in developing countries (Broccolini et al., 2020). A fundamental principle 
guiding MDBs’ engagement with private sector operations is “additionality”: MDB 
 
1 The PPI Database of the World Bank is obtained by the website: 
https://ppi.worldbank.org/en/customquery. 
2  The data of the world GDP is retrieved from the World Economic Outlook Databases of the 
International Monetary Fund: 
 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx. 
 
support of the private sector should make a contribution that is beyond what is available, 
or that is otherwise absent from the market, and should not crowd out the private sector.3 
The MDB Task Force has materialized the harmonized framework of additionality and 
provided a more detailed breakdown of what constitutes additionality. In the Task Force 
report in 20184, they define the two types of additionality – financial and non-financial 
additionality, and show the following criteria as one of examples of evidence to 
demonstrate financial additionality in terms of financing beyond what is available in the 
markets: MDBs provide or mobilize meaningfully “larger loan amounts” compared to 
what is available in the market at reasonable cost and terms (see Table 1). 
This paper aims to provide empirical evidence for demonstrating MDB financial 
additionality in PPI projects in terms of financing beyond what is available in the markets. 
To verify the existence of MDB financial additionality, this study examines whether the 
PPI projects with multilateral support have significantly larger investment values than 
those without the support, by using the PPI database of the World Bank. The larger 
investment commitments by MDB support in infrastructure projects, particularly, in least 
developed countries where private financing is not surely expected in the projects, are 
considered to be a meaningful proof of MDB financial additionality. The major 
contribution of this study is to quantify MDB financial additionality using the project-
level data, while there have been limited empirical studies in this field in the literature. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
related to the empirical studies of MDB role and clarifies this study’s contributions. 
Section 3 gives an overview of MDB financial additionality in PPI projects. Section 4 
conducts an econometric analysis to verify MDB financial additionality by describing key 
variables and data, methodology, estimation outcomes and discussions. The last section 
summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Contributions 
 
This section reviews the literature related to the empirical studies of MDB role and 
clarifies this study’s contributions. The major issue that has so far been discussed as a 
MDB role is the “mobilization of private finance”, that is, the MDB ability to crowd-in 
capital from private creditors. The MDB role of “resource mobilization” is also identified 
 
3 The five principles including “additionality” were endorsed by MDBs in 2012 as the “Multilateral 
Development Bank Principles to Support Sustainable Private Sector Operations”. See the website: 
https://www.ebrd.com/downloads/news/mdb.pdf. 
4  See the website: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/456886/mdb-
additionality-private-sector.pdf. 
 
as a vital element of financial additionality in the aforementioned MDB Task Force report 
in 2018, though it is classified differently from the category of “financing beyond what is 
available in the markets” in this study’s focus (see again Table 1). 
Regarding the resource mobilization, there have been serious disputes on whether 
MDB lending has a crowding-in effect or a crowding-out effect on private capital inflows. 
Rodrik (1995) revealed little evidence that multilateral lending has acted as a catalyst for 
private capital flows, although it argued a rationale for multilateral lending in terms of 
information provision and conditionality. Basilio (2017) showed that multilateral support 
even reduces the private participation in infrastructure projects, thereby implying its 
substitution effect, through the empirical analysis of the determinants of the projects. On 
the other hand, Broccolini et al. (2020) identified positive and significant mobilization 
effects of MDBs on private capital in terms of the size of bank inflows, the number of 
lenders and the average maturity, by using loan-level data on syndicated lending to a large 
sample of developing countries. In their study, however, there is no evidence of 
mobilization effects in the infrastructure sector alone. MDBs themselves estimated their 
mobilization effects of private finance by collecting the commitment data directly from 
their own financial reports. MDBs (2019) reported that the total long-term finance 
mobilized by the MDBs from private investors in all low- and middle- income countries 
in 2019 was 63.6 billion US dollars, and those for infrastructure sector accounted for 46 
percent out of them. 
As for the other category, that is, non-financial additionality in Table 1, there have 
been empirical studies of the following MDB functions: providing a signaling to private 
markets on investment-friendly environments such as macroeconomic stability and the 
country’s commitment to reform (e.g., Eichengreen and Mody, 2001), mitigating political 
and credit risks (e.g., Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012; Gurara et al., 2020), and alleviating 
information asymmetry through technical assistance and capacity building (e.g., Chelsky 
et al., 2013). However, there have also been counter arguments against the MDB 
additionality: multilateral lending might create incentives for moral hazard with 
borrowing government financing low-return projects and delaying reforms, and would 
even signal severe economic distress (see Broccolini et al., 2020). 
While the outcomes of the aforementioned empirical studies have been inconclusive 
on MDB additionality, this study contributes to enriching its evidence from the following 
perspectives. First, this study demonstrates MDB financial additionality in terms of 
financing beyond what is available in the markets, whereas the previous studies have 
rather concentrated on the aspect of resource mobilization effects on private capital. 
Basílio (2015) showed the empirical result that the participation of MDBs is higher for 
 
less populous and poorer countries, which could be a proof of MDB financing beyond 
what is available in the markets. This study extends Basílio (2015) by verifying the larger 
investment commitments with MDB support than those without it even in least developed 
countries. Second, this study focuses on the infrastructure sector in terms of PPI projects. 
The seminal work of Broccolini et al. (2020) could not present evidence of MDB 
mobilization effects in the infrastructure sector alone, though they identified the effects 
in the total syndicated lending. Thus, it would be significant if this study could reveal 
MDB financial additionality in infrastructure sector from another angle. 
 
3. Overview of MDB Financial Additionality 
 
This section gives an overview of MDB financial additionality targeting all the PPI 
projects for 1996 – 2020 in 121 low- and middle- income countries based on the World 
Bank PPI database. Table 2 reports how larger investment commitments the individual 
PPI projects with multilateral support have compared with the average of total projects, 
as well as the frequency of the projects with multilateral support, for total and categorized 
projects by income levels, government effectiveness, and regions in the host country, and 
sectors and types in the projects. 
In totally aggregated projects, the number of the projects with multilateral support is 
1.167, accounting for 14.30 percent of the total projects numbered 8,161. The average 
total investment commitments of the projects with multilateral support are 268.4 million 
US dollars, larger by 18 percent than those of total average projects valued 227.7 million 
US dollars. 
In the first place, the total projects are classified by the host country’s income level 
into those in low-income, and lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income countries, 
according to the World Bank country classification.5 In this classification, the investment 
commitments of the multilateral-supported projects exceed those of total projects by 
around 20 percent regardless of income classes. The point to be worth noting is that the 
frequency of the multilateral-supported projects in low-income countries, 18.61 percent, 
is larger than that of total project, 14.30 percent. It suggests that the multilateral support 
has been working well even in low-income countries where private finance has been still 
too premature to accept. 
Second, the classification goes to the degree of government effectiveness in the PPI 
host countries. The government effectiveness index (gve) is retrieved from the Worldwide 
 
5 See the website: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519. 
 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank, which takes the number ranging from 
approximately -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high). 6  The index represents the government’s 
institutional quality and governance, defined in the database such as “perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies”. 
The interesting finding in Table 2 is that the higher index is attached to the country that 
the projects belong to, the larger excess in investment commitment values on the 
multilateral-supported projects relative to those in total average projects is found: 1.19 in 
gve > 0, 1.10 in -1 < gve < 0, and 1.04 in gve < -1. It should also be noted that in the 
lowest edge of the index (gve < -1), there is little gap in the commitments between the 
multilateral-supported projects and the total average ones. It implies that the MDB 
financial additionality, for its better performance, would require the enhancement of the 
host country’ government effectiveness, thereby necessitating the MDB assistances for 
its capacity building on the PPI projects. 
The remaining classifications do not seem to affect seriously the picture in the 
aforementioned case of the total average projects: the investment commitments of 
multilateral-supported projects exceed those of total average projects. The points to be 
worth noting are summarized as follows: in the regional classification, the frequency of 
multilateral-supported projects is relatively higher in sub-Saharan Africa and lower in 
Asia and Pacific, while the exceedance in investment commitments of that projects is 
higher in Asia and Pacific; in the sectoral classification, the energy sector has higher 
frequency of multilateral-supported projects, 18.69 percent, though it shows relatively 
lower exceedance in investment commitments of that projects; and in the type 
classification, there appears to be no serious difference in greenfield and brownfield 
projects. 
The findings above come from the simple observation of the PPI project database. 
However, the investment commitment values are also affected by time-varying country-
specific factors including host country’s macroeconomic conditions as well as year fixed 
effects such as world economic conditions. Here comes the necessity to apply an 
econometric approach to control these effects in the next section, so that the pure 




6 See the website: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/. 
 
4. Econometric Estimations on MDB Financial Additionality 
 
This section conducts an econometric analysis to verify MDB financial additionality 
by describing variables and data, methodologies, estimation outcomes and discussions. 
 
4.1 Variables and Data 
 
The variables for estimating MDB financial additionality in PPI projects are listed 
with their measurement and data sources in Table 3. The estimation equation is designed 
to equip one dependent variable (total investment commitments), five explanatory 
variables to control time-varying country-specific effects (the host country’s 
macroeconomic conditions), and dummy variables for the projects with multilateral 
support and for categorizing the projects by income levels, government effectiveness, and 
regions in the host country, and sectors and types in the projects. The variables for 
macroeconomic conditions are selected from those used commonly in the related 
literature on the determinants of PPI (Banerjee et al., 2006; Hammami et al., 2006; Basilio, 
2011; and Moszoro et al., 2015). The descriptive statistics of data for the variables are 
presented in Table 4. The details of each variable are shown as follows. 
The total investment commitments (ppi) of each PPI project retrieved from the World 
Bank PPI database are expressed in terms of million US dollars, and transformed in 
logarithm to avoid scaling problem in the estimation. Regarding the variables for country-
specific macroeconomic conditions, the estimation adopts five indicators: Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (gdp), GDP per capita (ypc), inflation (inf), exchange rate (exr), 
and government budget balance (gbl): GDP and GDP per capita are shown by current US 
dollars (GDP by billion US dollars); inflation is expressed by year-on-year rate of changes 
in consumer prices; exchange rate is presented by the period average of national currency 
per US dollars; and government budget balance is expressed by the general government 
net lending or borrowing as a percent of GDP. All the macroeconomic data come from 
the World Economic Outlook Databases of the International Monetary Fund. GDP, GDP 
per capita and exchange rate are set in logarithm to avoid scaling issues. All the 
macroeconomic variables are lagged by one year as they might be endogenous to the 
model. GDP and GDP per capita are supposed to have coefficients with positive sign since 
they represent the market size and purchasing power of host countries. The coefficient of 
inflation is expected to have a negative sign because it shows macroeconomic instability. 
The coefficient in exchange rate and the negative coefficient of government budget 
balance are expected to be positive because the currency depreciation and budget deficit 
 
might attract PPI projects in host countries. 
Turning to dummy variables, the most important one is the dummy for the projects 
with multilateral support (d_multi) so that MDB additionality can be identified when the 
coefficient of this dummy is significantly positive. The estimation also equips the 
dummies by five categories: income levels, government effectiveness, and regions in the 
host country, and sectors and types in the projects. The reason for adopting these dummies 
is to check the existence of selection bias: when the projects with multilateral support 
concentrate only on specific region, sector and type, for instance, the estimation result 
might lose its validity to prove MDB additionality. The additionality could be justified 
only when the exceedance of investment commitments for multilateral-supported projects 
are identified in any components of any categories. For that purpose, the estimation equips 
cross term of dummies: a dummy for multilateral-supported projects times a dummy of 
each component in five categories, and the coefficients of these dummies are expected to 
be significantly positive regardless of the components of the categories. Each category 
has the following components’ dummies: income levels have the dummies of low income 
(d_low), lower middle income (d_lmid), and upper middle income (d_umid); government 
effectiveness (gve) has the dummies of gve < -1 (d_gvel), -1 < gve < 0 (d_gvem), and gve 
> 0 (d_gveh); regions have the dummies of Asia and Pacific (d_Asia), sub-Saharan Africa 
(d_Africa), and Latin America (d_Latin); sectors have the dummies of energy (d_energy), 
transport (d_transport), and others (d_other); and types have the dummies of greenfield 
(d_green) and brownfield (d_brown). The data used for the classification are just the same 
as the one in Section 3.   
Then the study constructs an unstructured dataset with 8,161 PPI projects for 1996 – 
2020 containing 121 countries for the subsequent estimation, which follows the data 




The equations for the estimation are specified as follows. For the simple estimation 
of total projects: 
 
 ln ppiitk = β * Eit + μ * d_multik + νt + εitk      (1) 
   ppiitk = exp [β * Eit + μ * d_multik) + νt ] + εitk      (2)  
 
For the estimation considering five categories of the projects: 
 
 
 ln ppiitk = β * Eit + γ * Dj + μ * (d_multik * Dj) + νt + εitk    (3) 
   ppiitk = exp [β * Eit + γ * Dj + μ * (d_multik * Dj) + νt ] + εitk    (4)  
 
where Equation (1) and (3) are the form of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and 
Equation (2) and (4) are the one of Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
estimation. The subscripts i, t, and k denote host countries (the 121 low- and middle- 
income countries), years (1996–2020), and project number (8,161 PPI projects), 
respectively; E is the variables for country-specific time-varying macroeconomic 
conditions: GDP (gdp), GDP per capita (ypc), inflation (inf), exchange rate (exr), and 
government budget balance (gbl); ν denotes year fixed effects; ε is error terms; β, γ, and 
μ are parameters of variables; and Dj is the dummies under the five categories: j = 1, 2, 
…, 5, that is, d_low, d_lmid, and d_umid in income levels; d_gvel, d_gvem, d_gveh in  
government effectiveness; d_Asia, d_Africa, and d_Latin in regions; d_energy, 
d_transport, and d_other in sectors; and d_green and d_brown in types. The most critical 
parameter is μ, in particular, in Equation (3) and (4), that is, the coefficient of cross term 
of dummies: a significantly positive coefficient in any components of any categories 
implies the existence of MDB additionality. 
The reason why this study applies the PPML estimator in Equation (2) and (4) as well 
as the OLS one in Equation (1) and (3) is that the investment commitments in the PPI 
database contain zero value and are plagued by “heteroskedasticity” problem. The OLS 
estimator with log-linear form drops zero observations from estimation sample and also 
leads to a bias and an inconsistency in its estimate under the heteroskedasticity. Instead, 
as Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) advocated, the PPML estimator takes advantage of 
information with zero value and accounts for the heteroskedasticity. This study applies 
both estimators for a robustness check. 
 
4.3 Estimation Outcomes and Discussions 
 
Table 5 reports the results of OLS estimation on total projects in Equation (1) and on 
the projects containing five categories in Equation (3), and Table 6 reports the results of 
PPML estimation in Equation (2) and (4) in the form of log-link function. 
Both OLS and PPML estimations show almost the same outcomes in the sign and 
significance of each coefficient except its magnitude. Looking at the estimation results 
on total projects in Column (a), the coefficients of the dummies for multilateral-supported 
projects (d_multi) are exp. (0.671) = 1.956 in OLS estimation in Table 5 and exp. (0.157) 
= 1.170 in PPML estimation in Table 6. Considering that the investment commitments of 
 
multilateral-supported projects are larger than those of total average projects by 18 
percent from the simple observation in Section 3, the PPML estimation that can deal with 
the zero value and heteroskedasticity seems to reveal a reasonable result. Thus, the 
subsequent description focuses on the results of PPML estimation. 
Regarding macroeconomic variables, it is commonly found from Column (a) to (f) 
that the coefficients of GDP per capita (ypc) and exchange rate (exr) are significantly 
positive and the government budget balance (gbl)’s coefficient is significantly negative, 
as are expected in Section 4.1., and that the coefficients of GDP (gdp) and inflation (inf) 
are insignificant, which suggests that the market size and price stability of host countries 
are not an important factors to affect the PPI investments. 
The result focusing on the category of income levels shown in Column (b) shows that 
all the coefficients of the cross terms of dummies, d_multi times d_low, d_lmid, and 
d_umid are significantly positive. It should be noted that the low-income countries 
represented by d_multi times d_low have the largest magnitude of coefficients. This 
implies that the multilateral support has been effective even in low-income countries in 
terms of its financial additionality in PPI projects. As for the category of government 
effectiveness (gve), the cross term of d_multi times d_low is insignificant whereas the 
other cross terms are significantly positive. This means that in the host countries where 
their government effectiveness index is extremely low by gve < -1, multilateral support 
loses its significance, thereby requiring the governance enhancement and capacity 
building in the host countries for MDB financial additionality to work. In the other 
categories, that is, regions, sectors, and types, all the coefficients of the cross terms are 
significantly positive regardless of their components, implying the validity of MDB 
financial additionality. 
The findings above contribute to the literature in this field as follows. First, the result 
of identifying MDB additionality in low-income countries in this study seems to be 
consistent with Basilio (2015), which argued the high participation of MDBs in poorer 
countries. Second, the new finding of this study is that the estimation verifies the MDB 
role in infrastructure projects, whereas Basilio (2017) and Broccolini et al. (2020) could 
not find out MDB mobilization effect in the infrastructure sector. Third, another new 
insight in this study is that MDB additionality role is affected by the host country’s 
government effectiveness, which implies some need for MDB assistances for capacity 
building. 
In sum, the econometric estimation verifies MDB financial additionality in PPI 
projects, as the exceedances in investment commitments of multilateral-supported 
projects compared to the total average projects are identified in any income levels, regions, 
 
sectors and types. In particular, MDB financial additionality is valid even in low-income 
countries where private finance is still too premature to be available. It is also found that 
in the host countries where their government effectiveness is in the poorest edge, MDB 
financial additionality loses its significance, thereby requiring the governance 
enhancement and capacity building in the host countries for its additionality to work. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper attempted to provide empirical evidence for demonstrating MDB financial 
additionality in PPI projects in terms of financing beyond what is available in the markets. 
To verify the existence of MDB financial additionality, this study examined whether the 
PPI projects with multilateral support have significantly larger investment commitments 
than the total average projects, by using the PPI database of the World Bank. The major 
contribution of this study is to quantify MDB financial additionality using the project-
level data, while there have been limited empirical studies in this field in the literature. 
The main findings through the data observation and econometric analysis are 
summarized as follows. MDB financial additionality is identified in PPI projects in that 
the larger investment commitments of multilateral-supported projects beyond the average 
are confirmed in any income levels and regions in host countries, and any sectors and 
types in the projects. In particular, MDB financial additionality is valid even in low-
income countries where private finance is still too premature to be available, in terms of 
the large investment commitments and the higher frequency of multilateral-supported 
projects in these countries. In the host countries where their government effectiveness is 
in the poorest edge, however, MDB financial additionality loses its significance, thereby 
requiring the governance enhancement and capacity building in the host countries for its 
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Table 1 MDB Additionality in Private Sector Operation 
 
Sources: Extracted from MDB Task Force (2018) 
 
Table 2 Overview of MDB Financial Additionality in PPI Projects 
 
Sources: Author’s calculation based on the World Bank PPI database. 
  
Category Type
Funancing Structure (Financing Beyond What is Available in the Markets)
Amount: MDBs provide or mobilize meaningfully larger loan amounts compared
to what is available in the market at reasonable cost and terms.
Innovative Financing Structures and/or Instruments
MDBs’ Own Account Equity
Resource Mobilization
Risk Mitigation
Policy, Sector, Institutional, or Regulatory Change
Standard-Setting: Helping Projects and Clients Achieve Higher Standards









Investment (ave. mil $)
(d)
Total 8,161 227.7 1,167 268.4 14.30 1.18
[Host Country's Income Levels] 
Low 908 132.5 169 163.2 18.61 1.23
Lower middle 3,216 208.0 495 248.6 15.39 1.20
Upper middel 4,037 264.8 503 323.3 12.46 1.22
[Host Country's Government Effectiveness (gve )]
gve  < -1 116 225.8 27 235.7 23.28 1.04
-1 < gve  < 0 4,046 237.4 653 261.3 16.14 1.10
gve  > 0 3,040 224.8 340 268.1 11.18 1.19
[Host Country's Regions]
Asia and Pacific 3,880 199.9 281 292.0 7.24 1.46
Sub-Saharan Africa 483 190.0 147 253.5 30.43 1.33
Latin America 2,746 235.7 469 255.8 17.08 1.09
[Project's Sectors]
Energy 4,602 212.3 860 237.6 18.69 1.12
Transport 1,935 339.2 186 397.4 9.61 1.17
Others 1,624 138.4 121 289.0 7.45 2.09
[Project's Types]
Greenfield 5,085 222.7 740 256.1 14.55 1.15
Brownfield 2,186 216.7 264 290.1 12.08 1.34





Table 3 List of Variables 
 
Notes:  
WB_PPI: PPI database, World Bank 
IMF_WEO: World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund 
WB_CL: Country Classification, World Bank 
WB_WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank 
Source: Author’s description 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
Variables Description Data Sources
Dependent Variables
ppi Total Investment Commitments of PPI [million USD, log term] WB_PPI
Explanatory Variables: Host Country's Macroeconomic Conditions
gdp Gross Domestic Product [current USD, log term, lagged]
ypc GDP per capita [current USD, log term, lagged]
inf Inflation, consumer prices [annual %, lagged]
exr National currency per USD [period average, log term, lagged]
gbl General government net lending/borrowing [percent of GDP, lagged]
Explanatory Variables: Dummy Variables [d_x =1, othewise o]
d_nulti Projects with multilateral support WB_PPI
<Host Country's Income Levels>
d_low Low income
d_lmid Lower middle income
d_umid upper middle income
<Host Country's Government Effectiveness (gve )>
d_gvel gve  < -1
d_gvem -1 < gve  < 0
d_gveh gve  > 0
<Host Country's Regions>
d_Asia Asia and Pacific (East Asia and Pacific, and South Asia)
d_Africa Sub-Saharan Africa














Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
ppi 8,108 229 666 1 35,587
gdp 7,894 2,071 3,288 0 14,340
ypc 7,891 4,940 3,831 159 18,832
inf 7,850 6.39 8.13 -3.90 325.03
exr 7,888 602 2,844 0 31,458
gbl 7,790 -3.45 3.23 -33.59 21.76
 




gdp 0.001 -0.002 0.000
(0.161) (-0.245) (0.975)
ypc 0.377 *** 0.283 *** 0.329 ***
(20.504) (5.579) (11.829)
inf 0.003 0.003 0.003
(1.315) (1.282) (1.210)
exr 0.088 *** 0.072 *** 0.074 ***
(10.079) (6.891) (7.165)
















d_multi * d_low 0.703 ***
(4.872)
d_multi * d_lmid 0.631 ***
(7.705)
d_multi * d_umid 0.660 ***
(8.615)
d_multi * d_gvel 0.342
(0.979)
d_multi * d_gvem 0.626 ***
(9.057)
d_multi * d_gveh 0.582 ***
(6,232)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes




Note: ***, **, * denote rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance, 
respectively. The figure in () denotes t-value. The coefficients of the time dummy are omitted here 
due to the space limitation. 
Sources: Author’s estimation 
 
(d) (e) (f)
gdp 0.045 *** 0.008 -0.004
(3.008) (0.738) (-0.403)
ypc 0.352 *** 0.303 *** 0.387 ***
(15.509) (11.232) (20.909)
inf 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.426) (0.828) (1.274)
exr 0.102 *** 0.055 *** 0.090 ***
(10.137) (5.530) (10.060)


















d_multi * d_Asia 0.860 ***
(8.526)
d_multi * d_Africa 0.695 ***
(4.310)
d_multi * d_Latin 0.603 ***
(7.350)
d_multi * d_ebergy 0.617 ***
(10.288)
d_multi * d_transport 0.474 ***
(3.898)
d_multi * d_other 1.321 ***
(8.632)
d_multi * d_green 0.617 ***
(9.228)
d_nulti * d_brown 0.726 ***
(6.856)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observation 7,357 7,357 7,357
 





gdp 0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.619) (-0.169) (-0.050)
ypc 0.115 *** 0.067 *** 0.079 ***
(18.995) (4.185) (8.899)
inf 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.071) (0.996) (0.949)
exr 0.027 *** 0.017 *** 0.017 ***
(9.983) (5.258) (5.474)
















d_multi * d_low 0.172 ***
(3.780)
d_multi * d_lmid 0.147 ***
(5.833)
d_multi * d_umid 0.140 ***
(8.217)
d_multi * d_gvel 0.079
(0.745)
d_multi * d_gvem 0.140 ***
(6.730)
d_multi * d_gveh 0.128 ***
(4,569)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes




Note: *** denotes rejection of null hypothesis at the 99% level of significance, respectively. The figure 
in () denotes t-value. The coefficients of the time dummy are omitted here due to the space 
limitation. 
Sources: Author’s estimation 
 
(d) (e) (f)
gdp 0.007 0.001 0.000
(1.569) (0.513) (0.089)
ypc 0.118 *** 0.072 *** 0.118 ***
(15.629) (8.128) (19.205)
inf 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.751) (0.620) (1.057)
exr 0.028 *** 0.013 *** 0.027 ***
(8.795) (4.000) (9.848)


















d_multi * d_Asia 0.199 ***
(6.581)
d_multi * d_Africa 0.170 ***
(3.469)
d_multi * d_Latin 0.137 ***
(5.574)
d_multi * d_ebergy 0.139 ***
(7.375)
d_multi * d_transport 0.095 ***
(2.623)
d_multi * d_other 0.332 ***
(6.778)
d_multi * d_green 0.144 ***
(7.153)
d_nulti * d_brown 0.162 ***
(5.126)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observation 7,357 7,357 7,357
